Abstract. Borrowing from Norbert Elias, we introduce the habitus of restraint to the study of security communities. This habitus constitutes a key dimension of the glue that holds security communities together. The perceived compatibility of practices emanating from the habitus that members hold fosters the collective identity upon which a security community is built. The violation of a member's habitus by the practices of another member, however, disrupts the reproduction of collective identity and triggers a crisis of the security community. Our analysis of Germany's reaction to Washington's case for war against Iraq provides empirical evidence for the salience of the habitus for the internal dynamics of security communities.
Introduction
At first glance, it is surprising that Saddam Hussein triggered the deepest post-World War II rift in the usually amicable relationship between the United States and Germany. The two countries share many values that should have prevented action taken against a vicious dictator from becoming a contentious issue. Saddam Hussein's longstanding record of gross human rights abuses and aggression against other states should have been yet another reason to draw the two allies even closer together.
This scenario, however, failed to materialise. Not only did the United States and Germany fail to find a common ground on Iraq. They even started to fundamentally question the nature of their relationship. Politicians exchanged several rounds of insults, ranging from Hitler-Bush comparisons in Germany to likening Berlin's policy towards Iraq to the ones of Libya and North Korea in the United States. Intellectual elites and the public joined the chorus of sometimes severe criticism against the other country.
This study focuses on Germany's reaction. Why did Germany react with such vigour to Washington's argument for war against Saddam Hussein? The existing literature cannot explain this empirical puzzle. The realist literature on alliances revolves around the concept of balancing. Germany, however, did not balance * The authors would like to thank Emanuel Adler, Ted Hopf, Nancy Kokaz, Homeira
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against the United States. Complex interdependence focuses on the sensitivity and vulnerability of a state vis-à-vis another. Washington's threats to punish its unreliable ally, however, did not make Berlin forgo its anti-war stance. Diversionary theories of war and peace cannot explain why some leading politicians followed the public sentiment and others did not. Finally, the constructivist literature on security communities fails to explain Germany's reaction because the internal dynamics of security communities remain little understood. In order to improve our grasp of these dynamics, we introduce the 'habitus of restraint' to the study of security communities. Our contention focuses on the ways of how enduring dispositions shape foreign policy. Following Norbert Elias's conceptualisation of the habitus, we identify two layers of deeply internalised predispositions that are distilled from history: a set of internal checks and selfrestraints against the use of force in world politics; and, underpinning these constraints, a durable set of anxieties and feelings of shame concerning past uses of force in international relations.
In a security community, some dimensions of a member state's habitus are idiosyncratic whereas others are shared with other members of the community. The extent to which a habitus is shared across a security community is unclear to its members. The habitus, being a second nature, does not lend itself to be put under scrutiny and reflected upon by those who hold it. Yet the perceived compatibility of practices generated through the habitus is apparent to the members. A member state may perceive a compatibility between the range of conceivable practices that emanate from its habitus on the one hand and its perception of the practices of other members on the other, or it may perceive a mismatch between the two.
We contend that the perception of compatibility or incompatibility has major repercussions for the internal dynamics of security communities. The perception of compatibility helps to reproduce collective identity. It assures the members that the community is firmly built on common ground. Standing on this common ground makes it possible for members to fine-tune their practices through bargaining and argumentation, and sometimes even to agree effortlessly on a set of practices that seem self-evident to everyone. The perception of incompatibility, by contrast, disrupts the collective identity on which the security community is built and propels it into crisis. Practices outside of a state's range of practices as delineated by its habitus violate this state's most taken-for-granted outlook on the world. This violation triggers demarcation from, instead of identification with, the member state whose practices are perceived to deny and reject the self-evident.
This process provides a plausible explanation for Germany's reaction against Washington's case for war against Iraq. Germany's habitus of restraint, constituted largely by constraints underwritten by anxiety and shame pertaining to the Second World War, clashed with Washington's practices. The latter were outside the range of conceivable practices that Germany's habitus circumscribed. This made agreement on a course of action impossible, disrupted the identification with the United States, and gave rise to sharp demarcation.
This article is organised into six sections. First, we review the existing literature. Second, we discuss Elias's concept of the habitus and define it in a manner that makes it amenable to empirical research on security communities. Third, we describe the efforts by the United States to sway the world community into supporting its stance on Iraq. Fourth, we investigate Germany's dominant habitus. Fifth, we analyse how Germany came to demarcate itself from the United States. Finally, the Conclusion summarises our findings and highlights the leads that the habitus of restraint provides for further research.
Shortcomings of the existing literature
Four literature-sets pertain to the research puzzle: realist scholarship on alliances, sensitivities and vulnerabilities of states as identified in the complex interdependence literature, the diversionary theory of war, and constructivist research on security communities. None of these approaches, however, can explain convincingly the schism between the United States and Germany during the Iraq crisis.
According to the classical version of the realist approach, 1 states protect their security by maintaining a favourable equilibrium of power in the system, either by increasing their military capabilities or by building military alliances. Stephen Walt's refinement of the balancing argument maintains that states do not balance against power alone, but against states that are perceived to pose the greatest threat. 2 Realist scholarship, however, cannot explain the German reaction to Washington's stance on Iraq. Germany did not try to balance against the United States. German criticism of the Bush Administration's stance on Iraq was not accompanied by any attempt to increase its military power or to engineer a military counter-alliance. Germany was also far from considering the United States a threat to its security. The United States possesses strong offensive capabilities and still maintains a significant number of troops in Germany, but Germany has not felt threatened by them. On the contrary, Germany continues to regard the US military presence on its soil as an essential component of its security and defence policies. 3 The neo-liberal theory of complex interdependence contends that the flow of money, goods, information, and people across international borders has given rise to a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence among states. As a result, a high degree of sensitivity and vulnerability of a state's economy to global flows can be easily rendered by another state into a political leverage. 4 Complex interdependence, however, does not provide a compelling account of Germany's reaction. There are two reasons for this. First, the German economy was not particularly vulnerable and sensitive to a regime change in Iraq. The level of trade between Germany and Iraq before the war was insignificant for the German economy. Iraq ranked 138th with regard to imports and 83rd as far as exports were concerned among Germany's trading partners. Second, the German economy was very vulnerable and sensitive to US reprisals for not going to war against Iraq. The United States represented the third most important exporting country (7.33 per cent or V 39,045.6 m), and the The diversionary theory of war is one of the most influential explanations of war. Staying in power is assumed to be the key preference of governing elites. War is a means that they readily use if it serves the purpose of staying in power. 6 Of course, a diversionary theory of war cannot explain German criticism of the United States. After all, it was Washington and not Berlin that went to war. But what about a diversionary theory of peace? Did the Chancellor, trailing in the opinion polls, reject the military option in order to exploit the anti-war sentiment of the electorate and secure his re-election? 7 At first glance, there seems to be evidence for this contention. Gerhard Schrö der rejected the military option at the beginning of his electoral campaign, which was seriously hampered by his failures in the economic realm. His popularity among the electorate increased significantly after he had announced that Germany would under no circumstances participate in a war against Iraq. The major problem of the diversionary explanation, however, is that only Schrö der embarked on an anti-war course but not Edmund Stoiber, his challenger at the polls. Furthermore, leaders in other countries, such as José Maria Aznar, Tony Blair, and Silvio Berlusconi, risked their political careers by going to war. Rational choice explanations, such as diversionary theories, assume nomothetic laws. Thus, it is puzzling for this approach if some leaders risk losing power because they act against the will of the populace, but others seize the opportunity and act in accordance with his or her interests in retaining power. 8 The constructivist turn in International Relations theory was triggered by the shortcomings of rationalist approaches in explaining important international phenomena. Do ideational explanations fare better than the accounts discussed above? Considering the long-time friendship between the United States and Germany, the literature on security communities seems apt to shed light on the German reaction. Karl Deutsch coined the security community concept. 9 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett elaborated on the concept. A security community is much more than an alliance. It is a community of states defined by three characteristics: (1) shared identities, meanings, and values; (2) many-sided and direct relations; (3) a certain degree of long-term reciprocity. These conditions generate collective identification as well as mutual trust, and give rise to dependable expectations of peaceful change. Positive identification with one another prevents members of the security community from even considering the use of force against one another. 10 The security community concept captures US-German relations much better than the concepts of alliance or complex interdependence, which omit the ideational dimension of the relationship. Unfortunately, however, little has been written on the internal dynamics of security communities. 11 How is collective identity reproduced? How does the collective identity of a security community unravel? How does a security community overcome a collective identity crisis? A plausible explanation of this study's research puzzle requires answers to these questions.
Criticising Adler and Barnett for neglecting situations in which the collective identity is threatened, Janice Mattern introduces the concept of representational force to the study of security communities. According to the author, collective identity can be rescued from situations of crisis by the use of a 'narrative gun'. Government elites of one state pressure the elites of another state into forgoing their dissent by forcing them into the non-choice of either violating an aspect of their identity or complying with the collective identity as represented by the author of the representational force. 12 Mattern's argument is tailored to exactly the type of situation that occurred in the trans-Atlantic security community between Germany and the United States prior to the United States-led military operation in Iraq. Does her argument help to explain the sharp disagreement between Germany and the United States about the resort to force against Saddam Hussein? The two states failed to reach a consensus on a vital issue. According to Mattern, the two states or at least one of them should have used representational force to coerce the other back into the 'we-feeling'. The United States did exactly that. George W. Bush made clear that not supporting the United States meant leaving the common ground with the United States: 'Either you are with us or you are against us'. 13 Donald Rumsfeld put Germany in the dubious company of Libya and Cuba when he listed the countries opposed to war. 14 The narrative gun, however, did not have the effect that Mattern predicts. It did not help to fasten the security community. If anything, it made the diplomatic skirmishes between Germany and the United States even worse.
Habitus and security community
Despite the use of a 'narrative gun', Germany continued to oppose the war against Iraq. What exactly was Germany defending so strongly, even at the risk of undermining the relationship with its most important ally? This section borrows from Norbert Elias's conceptualisation of the habitus in order to address the internal dynamics of security communities.
Elias embeds his concept of the habitus into his theory of the civilising process. The author contends that, although the civilising process remains in its infancy, 15 modern societies have made some -albeit anything but irreversible -progress towards deeply internalising an aversion against cruelty and violence. Learning was the key mechanism that gave rise to this aversion. Greater control of violence and aggression in the modern state was accompanied by a changing sensibility towards violence and cruelty to the extent that such acts became gradually morally repugnant and 'progressively thrust behind the scenes of people's communal life'. 16 Elias provides four important clues about the constitution of this habitus. First, the habitus is made up of constraints about the use of force. 17 Second, the constraints that make up the habitus are underpinned by deeply-seated anxieties and feelings of shame. 18 Third, the restraints that make up the habitus are distilled history. A nation's historical practices and experiences become sedimented into its habitus. 19 Fourth, the habitus is deeply internalised. Elias maintains that fears and shamealong with the constraints they buttress -are initially not internalised but their existence is dependent on overt sanctioning potential by, say, a chief or a monarch. Yet over time, they sink in. 20 Elias's habitus, therefore, is in Hegel's words, 'a second nature' 21 or in Bourdieu's words, 'history turned into nature.' 22 The habitus is distilled history that is deeply ingrained and taken for granted.
It is not that Elias's work is without its problems. Elias's Civilising Process was published at the eve of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Reacting to these catastrophes, much of his later work sought to comprehend this decivilising process rather than a civilising process. 23 Elias never problematised the concept of civilising even though the label 'civil' may actually be a dangerous tool in the hands of a Self that is eager to brag about its supposed superiority and to discriminate against the Other based on its alleged inferiority. It is not quite clear whether Elias' underlying assumptions about human nature are warranted. He assumes human beings to be dangerous animals as long as they are unconstrained by the forces of the civilising process. Yet some of the constraints that the civilising process imposes -including those that are deeply internalised -may not be as benign as Elias makes them out to 15 be. 24 Finally, there is not just one habitus, but there are many habitus, which govern different spheres of life. Elias makes a strong case for a habitus that restrains actors in using force. Yet other habitus encourage actors to use force, 25 and again others have very little to do with physical force. 26 Despite these problems, however, Elias's conceptualisation of the habitus as a habitus of restraint is very useful for making sense of the dynamics of security communities. We define the concept as a two-layered set of deeply ingrained and historically distilled predispositions: the first layer consists of a set of internal checks and self-restraints against the use of force in international politics; the second layer, underpinning these constraints, encompasses a durable set of anxieties and feelings of shame emanating from past experiences with the use of force.
To some degree, every security community shares a habitus of restraint, henceforth simply referred to as habitus. The very existence of a security community is dependent on this restraint. In a security community, member states do not even contemplate the use of force against one another any more. Restraint becomes a second nature. Furthermore, the habitual restraint also provides much needed shared orientation for the security community in its interaction with the outside. Security communities do not use force on a random basis regardless of any predispositions about what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of force.
A security community, however, is not a monolithic bloc. It consists of member states. As Elias points out correctly, these member states have different histories and distil these histories into different habitual restraints as well as into different sentiments of fear and shame that underpin these restraints. Of course, this does not mean that the habitus of a nation ends abruptly at its territorial borders. Some aspects of the habitus that are dominant in member states are shared across the community. Yet others are peculiarities arising from how nations sediment their own histories into the habitus.
The extent to which a member state perceives a compatibility between the range of conceivable practices that emanate from its habitus and the practices of another member is of key importance for the dynamics of a security community. Compatibility fosters the reproduction of the collective identity that holds the security community together and provides the possibility to reach agreement on a course of action. In some cases, this harmonisation occurs effortlessly and virtually automatically. In other cases, it is the outcome of argumentation and bargaining processes. Incompatibility, by contrast, not only makes a common course of action impossible but it also disrupts the collective identity that holds the security community together. It shows a member that the taken-for-granted foundation for acting on an issue area of utmost importance -the use of force -turns out to be rejected by a fellow member. The disruption of the collective identification process gives rise to a crisis of the security community.
This rupture threatens the very existence of a security community if the mismatch pertains to the use of force by a member of a security community against another 24 member, because the habitual restraint vis-à-vis other members is the core feature of a security community. Yet severe crises also occur if the mismatch is pertinent to the use of force against a non-member. Even in this case, the mismatch shakes the shared ideational foundation on which the security community is built. The crisis may be only temporary. The international constellation, for example, may change and the question of the use of force may no longer be on the agenda. Yet the crisis may come to threaten the very existence of the security community if the perceived mismatch endures.
Does this account focusing on the habitus provide a plausible explanation for Germany's vigorous opposition to Washington's case for war against Saddam Hussein? Did Germany react with such vigour because Washington's practices were outside the range of conceivable practices that Germany's dominant habitus delineated? Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we provide an overview of the construction of the Iraqi threat and the advocacy to counter this threat through military force by the Bush Administration. Our analysis starts with 11 September 2001 and ends with the beginning of the war against Iraq.
Second, we investigate the German habitus. Uncovering the habitus is not an easy task. The habitus is deeply ingrained, which makes it difficult to detect. We chose to focus on discourse on major international crises since the end of the Cold War, in order to identify the habitus. In the heated debates during a crisis, actors invoke what they take for granted. Relating what appears to them most self-evident to the pervasive uncertainty of a crisis situation helps actors to cope with the situation. We analysed three grand debates on the use of force in Germany since the end of the Cold War and prior to the controversy about regime change in Iraq: the Second Gulf War in 1991, Kosovo in 1998, and Afghanistan in 2001. We examine the debates in the Bundestag -the decisive chamber of the two-chamber Parliament in matters of foreign policy -and in the two leading news magazines Focus and Spiegel. 27 Third, we trace the German reaction to the US advocacy for war against Iraq. We use five clusters of sources in order to capture this reaction in detail: (1) interviews with decision-makers; 28 (2) Bundestag debates; 29 (3) Focus and Spiegel; (4) the three influential policy-orientated journals Internationale Politik, WeltTrends, and Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte; and (5) public opinion data.
Bush's resolve: call to arms
The proposal to attack Iraq had been pushed up on the political agenda of the Bush Administration in the period immediately after 11 September 2001. 30 official policy approximately a year later when the Administration announced that confronting Iraq pre-emptively was an essential part of the global War Against Terrorism. 31 According to Washington, regime change in Iraq was necessary in order to root out the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being traded and used against the United States and its allies by Saddam Hussein and the terrorist networks that he allegedly supported.
The linchpin of the US argument to attack Iraq revolved around the notion of the imminence of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. In his speech at the United Nations on 12 September 2002, US President George W. Bush described the Iraqi regime as 'a grave and gathering danger,' seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and cooperating with terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda. 32 In Washington's view, there was unambiguous evidence that Iraq posed such an imminent threat. Bush argued that various intelligence assessments and the systematic obstructions of the UN weapons inspections by Saddam Hussein provided sufficient proof that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a threat to international peace and security by sponsoring terrorist networks.
Having made up its mind about the threat that Iraq posed, the Bush Administration tried to persuade the international community of the necessity to take military action. Initially, Bush's attempts were partly successful. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 in November 2002, which threatened 'serious consequences' against Iraq if it failed to comply with the strengthened weapons inspections regime. The UN weapons inspectors continued their work for another five months. Washington's attempts to persuade the world community of more determined action against Iraq, however, were seriously hampered by the lack of compelling proof for the imminence of danger. The weapons inspectors did not find weapons of mass destruction and pleaded for more time to complete their task.
At times, the Bush Administration dismissed questions about evidence by reversing the burden of proof. In the post-9/11 environment, Donald Rumsfeld argued, the nature of the evidence required for launching a military attack has significantly changed. The burden of proof no longer falls on the attacking side but on the side suspected to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction. 33 Yet the United States also attempted to persuade potential allies through evidence. In an effort to strengthen the case for war, US Secretary of State Colin Powell laid out the US file of evidence on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes before the UN Security Council. 34 With the efforts to persuade not yielding the desired success, Washington resorted to a policy of rewards and punishments in order to engineer the 'Coalition of the Willing'. This policy ranged from promises of developmental aid to threats of unspecified consequences, the reallocation of US military bases abroad, cancellation of foreign and military aid, reduction of financial investments, and denial of access to 31 36 Returned to power with the Bush Administration in 2000, the members of this neoconservative group pushed forcefully for a change of direction in US foreign policy. 37 Second, US foreign policy had embraced pre-emptive war. According to the Bush Doctrine, imminent danger has to be countered with military force before it is too late. This is the central lesson of 11 September. 38 The doctrine represents a major departure from prior international practices. The right of self-defence has been traditionally defined rather narrowly in order not to undermine the sovereignty and non-interference principles in international law, and due to the difficulties of unambiguously demonstrating the imminence of a threat prior to launching a pre-emptive attack. The ominous mentioning of the threat posed by the 'axis of evil' by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address hinted at possible other targets of pre-emptive attacks. 39
Germany's habitus: constraints, anxiety, shame, and history
Undoubtedly, there have been changes in German foreign policy since reunification but the intersubjective foundation on which these changes have occurred has proved to be rather enduring. In the 1990s, three international crises triggered major debates 35 42 Given the images of two world wars, Germans are highly sceptical about the possibility of a just conduct of war. Air strikes, in particular, trigger collective memories of the bombing nights that reduced German cities to rubble. Vera Wollenberger claims that with the beginning of air strikes on Baghdad in 1991, 'war showed its true face. It is a campaign against the Iraqi people [. . .] It is a crime against humanity.' 43 Wollenberger was part of the pacifistic wing of the Greens. Its principal opponent within the party was Joschka Fischer. Despite all their disagreements, they agreed on the nature of war. Fischer described it as follows when he made his case in favour of intervention in Afghanistan: 'War is disgusting. There is no such thing as a clinically clean war. It is in the nature of war that there are innocent victims.' 44 The second dimension of the habitus pertains to the degree of readiness to use military force and is also based on the lessons of two world wars. War is justifiable only as absolute last resort. Various members of the Bundestag put it similarly to Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul: ' We Germans know what two world wars meant in terms of humanitarian suffering and horrible sacrifices. In our people, therefore, there is a deep seated scepticism and caution against any kind of sabre-rattling and the playing down of the danger of war.' 45 Out of 50 speakers in the debates on the Second Gulf War, Kosovo and Afghanistan, every single one of them emphasised that the use of force must only be a means of absolute last resort, many of them using the legal terminology 'ultima ratio'. 46 The principal reason to use force as a last resort is embedded in the collective memory of Hitler's regime. Dictators who attack other states or slaughter their own people need to be confronted before it is too late. A principal argument before the Second Gulf War was that Saddam Hussein had, in stark violation of international law, annexed another state. This, Otto Graf Lambsdorff and, similarly many others with him argued, had to be opposed by the international community: '[. . .] if nothing helps, if the aggressor does not let lose of its prey, do we then accept the violation of law and do we Germans forget the experiences where acquiescence to dictatorship eventually leads or may lead?' 47 The key term acquiescence also featured prominently during the Kosovo debate. The world, and given their history, Germans in particular, must not turn a blind eye to large-scale humanitarian suffering caused by a despotic regime. 48 Gerald Häfner and Angelika Kö ster-Loßack, for example, compare the German experience to Kosovo. They caution:
that organised murder, expulsion and kidnapping of an entire people must never ever be accepted again and that we have to oppose murderers, even by the use of military force as last resort [. . .] . We have to continue to transform an era of violence and suppression, as it was characteristic for much of the 20th century (of which we Germans are especially guilty), into an era in which not terror and violence but tolerance, peaceful conflict resolution, and the abidance by law regulate the relations within and among states. 49 The third dimension of the habitus concerns alliances. Metaphorically speaking, Germans are children of Konrad Adenauer and not Wilhelm II. Most Germans interpret the experiences of World Wars I and II as evidence that Germany must never ever embark on a Sonderweg (special path) again. This term, used by historians to describe the alliance policies (or lack thereof) by Wilhelm II, has become a pejorative term. Germany has to act in concert with its allies, but never unilaterally. Ulrich Irmer put this very clearly: 'No, we must not opt for Sonderwege when it comes to fulfilling our international duties. We must not even opt for Sonderwege if this demands taking difficult and most difficult decisions [resort to military force].' 50 Instead of embarking on a Sonderweg, Kinkel emphasised, Germany needs to fulfil its 'European peace responsibility' and prove its 'reliability in the alliance'. 51 Wolfgang Bö tsch cautioned that 'Germany must not stand apart' when its allies attempt to deal with crises. 52 Schrö der and Fischer stressed the need to act in concert with NATO. 53 Finally, the fourth dimension of the habitus pertains to the vision of a horizontal world order. The historical reference points are Germany's role during the age of imperialism and Hitler's attempt at world domination. Much in the same way as the Sonderweg has become a pejorative term, Realpolitik and Machtpolitik (power politics) have become reminders of a past from which most Germans seek to distance themselves. In order to prevent the tragedies of the past from recurring, the current world order would have to be built on three principles: the rule of law, pluralism and dialogue, as well as partnership in crisis management. Gernot Erler's assertion in favour of the rule of law in international relations was a commonplace in all analysed debates: 'It remains our most fundamental persuasion that we have to be fully committed to a world order in which the power of the law triumphs over the power of the stronger'. 54 The United Nations is seen as the principal guarantor of the rule of law in international relations. 55 Dialogue and co-operation have been key words in all three Bundestag debates. The principal means of resolving conflicts and preventing disputes from arising is the respect for the 'plurality of cultures', 56 'cultural dialogue', 57 'intercultural dialogue', 58 as well as co-operation and integration across cultures and states. 59 If crises emerge despite these attempts to build bridges, they need to be managed by the international community and not by a hegemon. The United Nations on the world stage, and the European Union as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are seen as the key actors of crisis management. 60 In short, the dominant habitus predisposes Germany to be reluctant to support military interventionalism. Given the predominant interpretation of German history, military force is seen as justifiable only in extraordinary circumstances, that is, if it is directed against a Hitleresque regime and if it is -in sharp demarcation from Germany's past -part of a genuine multilateral effort.
Iraq delineated by the habitus: Germany's criticism of the United States
The habitus marked out a space of conceivable positions on the Iraq crisis. An unequivocal pro-war stance was outside this space. While the habitus made a range of positions on the Iraq issue possible, it predisposed Germany to a determined anti-war stance. The United States was accused of fighting a war for no legitimate reason and attempting to command, as opposed to consult, the world community. In the perception of many, Washington threatened to throw the world back into an era of domination. This perception triggered harsh criticism, sometimes even explicitly linking US practices to Germany's past attempts at world domination.
The discourse was dominated by two views: the majority was unambiguously opposed to the use of force; a minority refused to rule force out unilaterally. The minority view was articulated by the leadership of three of the four opposition parties in the Bundestag, Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union and the Free Democrats but not always backed on the grassroots levels. The news magazine Focus shared the ambiguous stance on the use of force.
Even the ambiguous minority used the habitus as the benchmark for its argumentation. Two arguments were put forward against ruling force out. First, war as a last resort would be justified against Saddam Hussein. He is a dictator who must to be confronted before it is too late. Michael Glos, for example, made the analogy with Hitler explicit:
Nobody -and most definitely nobody within the trans-Atlantic community -wants war. We know the lessons of the history of two world wars [. . .]. Yet we must keep in mind the consequences of pacifism in the last century. If the community of free nations had confronted Hitler early enough through political and -as ultima ratio -military means, Germany and the world would have been spared of a lot.
Applied to the case of Saddam Hussein, this lesson meant to pressure the dictator into complying with the weapons inspection regime through the threat of force. If this turned out to be insufficient, the international community would have to use force. 61 Second, the decision to go to war would have to be a multilateral one. If Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the weapons inspectors regime, it would be up to the international community, including Germany, to decide together whether military force should be used or not. No state should take a unilateral decision for or against war. The proponents of this multilateral decision accused Schrö der of embarking on a new Sonderweg. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the former foreign minister, criticised the 'hyper-Germanness' of Schrö der. Michael Glos and Wolfgang Schäuble compared Schrö der to Wilhelm II. 62 Edmund Stoiber warned that Schrö der had left the path towards the Europeanisation of national foreign policies and had embarked on 'a renaissance of national Sonderwege.' 63 The Focus warned that Schrö der was about to isolate Germany and to foster a new German nationalism. 64 Intellectuals were also part of the anti-Sonderweg chorus against Schrö der. Arnulf Baring warned that Germany stood at the crossroads as it did in 1871. A German Way would lead to a disaster again. Only the embeddedness of Germany into the trans-Atlantic community would offer a promising future. 65 Wilfried von Bredow warned that National Socialism had shown clearly that a German way could only lead into a catastrophe. 66 This twofold argumentation for at least considering the use of force -from the beginning merely a minority view -weakened over time. The closer the war came and the more obvious Washington's unilateralism became, the weaker the advocacy became. 67 The majority, however, unequivocally rejected the use of force from the outset. The benchmark for its argumentation was the same habitus that underpinned the ambiguous proponents' reasoning. Yet the opponents linked the habitus to the Iraq crisis in a fundamentally different manner. They employed the last resort and alliance dimensions of the habitus for their argumentation against the use of force. Additionally, they drew upon the nature of war and the world order dimensions to make their case against war.
The opponents of the military option rejected the argument that war was a last resort. According to the Spiegel, the US intervention was a 'war of aggression', 68 a 'crime', 69 'a war about the milk cow', 70 and a 'crusade'. 71 The United States was accused of insisting on war independently of the outcome of the weapons inspections. 72 In Parliament, Social Democrats and Greens criticised that war was anything but an ultima ratio in the case of Iraq. Fischer emphasised that 'all peaceful means really have to be exhausted', but that this was 'not the case at all.' 73 Schrö der stressed that this did not mean appeasement. He proposed several measures to make the weapons inspections more effective. 74 A number of politicians and political commentators compared North Korea and Iraq. They questioned why the United States offered the former a dialogue whereas the latter awaited military action, although North Korea was more advanced with the development of weapons of mass destruction than Iraq. 75 Public opinion data suggest that the public overwhelmingly supported his view that war against Iraq would not have been a matter of last resort. 76 The opponents of force also rejected the argument that Germany had embarked on a dangerous Sonderweg á la Wilhelm II. Gert Weisskirchen argued vehemently against the comparison between Schrö der and Wilhelm II. The former's goal is peace whereas the latter's was the aggrandisement of the German Empire by virtually any means. Furthermore, Weisskirchen contended, Germany was not isolated at all. A majority of European Union members was reluctant to participate in war. Many other nations, such as China and Russia, also shared the German scepticism to attack Iraq. 77 Fischer accused the Christian Democrats of trying to isolate France. 78 Many intellectuals joined the chorus that defended Schrö der against the allegation of breaking off Germany's ties with its allies. 79 Public opinion concurred again with Schrö der. The public did not regard Germany as isolated. According to an Emnid survey in September 2002, 56 per cent did not consider Germany isolated. In February 2003, this figure even increased to 73 per cent. 80 Yet the opponents of military force did not only connect two of the habitus dimensions differently to the Iraqi crisis. They also emphasised two aspects of the habitus that the proponents of intervention did not address: the nature of war and world order. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argued that Germans understand the horrors of war much better than US Americans:
One thing is for sure: Approximately half a century after the Second World War, Ausschwitz, Dresden and Stalingrad, the fear of war is even a bit greater in Germany than in other European states. The American nation, by contrast, has never experienced war in its own country. 81 In the Bundestag, Christoph Zö pel made the same argument, but stressed that Europeans shared the fear of war. 82 84 An equally forcefully articulated reason against intervention was based on the world-order dimension of the habitus. Many anti-war advocates accused the United States of violating the most basic lesson of international relations history: imperialism leads to instability and war. Only multilaterialism and dialogue can provide a peaceful international order. In the Bundestag, Schrö der warned in diplomatic words that the might of the strong must not replace the might of the law in international relations. 85 The resort to war in particular, Gernot Erler and Peter Struck emphasised, must not be the unilateral decision of the only remaining superpower but a multilateral decision taken within the framework of the United Nations. 86 The Spiegel accused the United States of imperialism in several articles, and stressed the role of historical lessons: 'In Paris, Moscow and Berlin, very different experiences with imperial ambitions were made, different conclusions were drawn from history.' 87 Public opinion agreed with the criticism of the United States. According to an Ipsos survey, 57 per cent of Germans felt that the United States played a negative role in safeguarding world peace. Only 23 per cent thought that the United States played a positive role. 88 Many intellectuals accused the United States of no longer resisting the lure of imperialism. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, one of the leading peace researchers in Germany, argued that the United States have embarked on an imperial style of rule. 89 Christian Tomuschat, a leading expert on international law, concurred. 90 Werner Link, Ottfried Nassauer, Claus Leggewie Lutz Schrader argued in a similar vein, often juxtaposing historical experiences that differ between Europe and the United States. 91 Many commentators sought to distance Europe from the United States and the Bush Administration. Jü rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, for example, argued that European visions for a world order are, partly due to historical experiences, different from the ones predominant in the United States. 92 It is this juxtaposition that crossed, when done by less sophisticated thinkers than Derrida and Habermas, the border of the reasonable and acceptable. In the eyes of some critics, the Bush Administration became the imperial evil that Germans and Europeans had striven to overcome since World War II. Ludwig Stiegler, the leader of the Social Democratic caucus in the Bundestag, compared George W. Bush to the Roman Emperor Augustus, who once sought to incorporate Germania into the Roman Empire. He also likened Dan Coats, the US ambassador in Germany, to Pjotr Abrassimow, the former Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, whose powers came closer to those of a governor than an ambassador. 93 Other comparisons also alluded to the allegation of US imperialism. Walter Kolbow, deputy foreign minister, alleged that Bush is 'not a partner but a dictator'. He later sought to downplay this accusation, but, for obvious reasons, his characterisation of Bush as 'a dictator of one-sided decisions' 94 hardly accomplished that. Hertha Däubler-Gmelin, the justice minister, had no qualms comparing Bush directly to Hitler -not a particularly apt comparison that understandably caused much anger in the United States. 95 In short, the habitus predisposed Germany to take an anti-war stance. Its four dimensions rendered an unambiguous pro-war stance inconceivable. The habitus did not make an ambiguous position for war as a last resort impossible but its nature of war and world order dimensions severely undermined this reasoning. The majority, emphasising these two dimensions and interpreting the link between the war as last resort and alliance dimensions different from the ambiguous proponents of force, chastised -often in very provocative terms -the war as unjustified.
Conclusion
For the last half-century, the German-American friendship has been a cornerstone of (West-)German foreign policy. Germany's sharp disagreement with the United States over Iraq was a major exception to this pattern. Not only did Germany refuse to follow Washington's lead but it also distanced itself, in quite unequivocal and angry manner, from its long-time friend. Why did the US advocacy for war against Iraq have this effect?
In order to provide a plausible explanation, we introduced -borrowing from the work of Elias -the concept of the habitus of restraint to the study of the internal dynamics of security communities. We argued that Germany's habitus of restraint, largely distilled from the Second World War, generated a range of conceivable practices that were incompatible with Germany's perception of Washington's case for war. Washington's practices were outside the pool of tenable practices that Germany's habitus marked out. Given this mismatch, not only was there no path available to reach agreement on a course of action. The mismatch even disrupted the shared identification that had been the pillar of German-US relations for half a century.
These findings allude to the usefulness of the concept of the habitus for the study of international relations in general and research on the internal dynamics of security communities in particular. There is a three-fold added value. First, the relationship between an actor's range of practices that its habitus delineates on the one hand and its perception of the practices of others on the other hand, helps in understanding patterns of conflict and co-operation. Compatibility makes co-operation possible. It provides the common ground for argumentation and bargaining, and sometimes even for what Bourdieu called 'a conductorless orchestration'. 96 Incompatibility, by contrast, makes co-operation impossible and even hampers -especially if the incompatibility persists -future co-operation because it disrupts the actors' collective identity. The trans-Atlantic security community, for example, would be put to a hard test if the resort to war were constantly on its agenda and if the case made for war by some members were to persistently violate the deeply ingrained dispositions of restraint of other members. Second, the habitus draws attention to the salience of historical lessons in political decision-making. To some extent, the findings of this study echo research on historical analogies. This study concurs that authoritatively interpreted historical facts serve as orientation for actors who try to cope with a novel situation whose unfamiliarity challenges them. 97 At the same time, however, this study goes beyond the notion that actors choose historical facts more or less freely and consciously in order to make up their minds about a situation. The distilled history that makes up the habitus is a second nature. Making use of the distilled history is not a choice but a necessary element of the process through which actors cope with the world. To some extent, the findings of this study also mirror Constructivist research on foreign policy. Research on German foreign policy, for example, often points to the inadvertent salience of the lessons of Germany's militaristic past. 98 This study is indebted to this research in various ways but it paints a more complex picture. It does not employ a mechanistic logic of appropriateness, according to which norms virtually determine the decisions of policymakers. Instead, this article emphasises that deeply ingrained historical interpretations merely mark out the range of conceivable practices.
Third, the habitus of restraint -the particular habitus on which this study has focused -plays a critical role for the resort to and the conduct of war. Elias's conceptualisation of a two-layered habitus, constituted by deeply ingrained constraints on the use of force and its underlying anxieties and feelings of shame, adds to existing studies on the institution of war. 99 It opens up a more profound layer, firmly situated in the actors' deep background, of this institution for research. It is worth noting in this context that the habitus of restraint is not a peculiarly German phenomenon. Of course, the German habitus of restraint has its ideosyncracies for obvious historical reasons. The habitus of other nations may be constituted by different sets of constraints and different underlying anxieties and shame. Yet they have a habitus of restraint nonetheless. The shame of the My Lai Massacre and the fear of a repetition of what happened to US soldiers in Somalia, for example, buttress a number of habitualised constraints for the conduct of war. These constraints, in turn, help explain the United States' reluctance to engage in ground warfare and attempts -however tragically unsuccessful they often are -to minimise civilian casualties.
As encouraging as the findings of this study are, many more theoretical and empirical explorations are needed to gain further insights into the salience of the habitus in world politics. Two avenues of research seem particularly important. First, how do actors come to select a habitus? Actors are socialised into the habitus and, through their practices, reproduce it. Yet how exactly does this socialisation work?
What explains why certain historical experiences become sedimented into the habitus -at times even revolutionise it -and others do not?
Second, how does the habitus interact with other ideational and material forces? The habitus enables actors to cope with the world without determining the outcome of their practices. It delineates the social parameters within which actors carry out their practices. Yet within these parameters, the habitus makes a variety of practices possible. Other forces explain in more detail which practices out of a range of possible practices an actor generates.
